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Patriotism and neutrality. The Spanish Parliament
and the Great War, 1914–181
MARCELLA AGLIETTI
SUMMARY
Despite the pressure exerted by rival protagonists, the Spanish government chose not
to be involved in the Great War. This decision converted Spain into a neutral state,
formally outside of the conflict yet deeply involved in several ways. Espionage and
smuggling conducted by the belligerents in Spanish territory called the sovereignty
of the state into question. In an effort to reduce these violations, the Spanish govern-
ment adopted measures limiting freedom and parliamentary powers that were consti-
tutionally guaranteed. As a result of the research carried out in the historical archives
of the Cortes of Madrid, this article will examine the parliamentary response to execu-
tive infringements on individual liberty and parliamentary rights, focusing on two
main aspects. First, the manner in which the Spanish deputies attempted to preserve
the authority and institutional primacy of the Parliament against executive power
during the war will be examined. Second, special attention will be paid to the
debates on legislation introducing ‘extraordinary powers’ of public authority in
1918. The results of this analysis allow for a further and more in-depth exploration
of the conventional depiction of the Spanish Parliament as passive and irrelevant at
the end of the Restoration era (1875–1923).
THE WARTIME PARLIAMENTARISM OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY
The history of the Spanish Parliament during the Great War has often been over-
looked by scholars, because the Cortes of that period have always been portrayed as
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1This article has been written as part of the proyecto de investigacio´n ‘El Mediterra`neo en las relaciones
internacionales de Espan˜a durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’ (HAR2010-16680), financed by the Min-
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being merely a product of the executive branch’s exploitation of turnismo2 while
manipulating election results through the encasillado3 system. In reality, however,
this view was the consequence of a widespread anti-parliamentary culture that
had turned the legislative body into a scapegoat for a corrupt political system.
Indeed, the influence of this characterization of the Spanish Parliament was so
strong that it even led scholars to shift their focus to other aspects of public life.4
By taking a different perspective and using Diario de sesiones de las Cortes as a
source, however, the history of the Spanish Parliament has proven to be crucial
in understanding both the political decisions that were made at the time as well
as the relationships between the various institutions in Spain. Yet the history of
the Spanish Parliament can also help to decipher the disjointed processes that
characterized the changing political landscape at the end of the Restoration regime.
Furthermore, the Spanish situation can be examined within the wider context
of European parliamentarism in order to highlight the similarities and differences,
as well as the ways in which the latter influenced the former. This approach allows
for an analysis that is not limited to a purely national focus. By examining recent
studies carried out across various academic disciplines, the traditional image of a
Spain on the fringes of the Great War can be radically revised. More extensive
analysis of diplomatic and military sources has revealed the vital role that Spain
played in the clash between the allied powers and the central powers in the
secret intelligence war that was taking place at the time, and in operations
aimed at securing supplies for the belligerent nations.5 Additional themes have
come to light as a result of comparative studies carried out on the neutral countries
during the war,6 ranging from the better known cases of Belgium and Luxembourg
2Turnismo refers to a political system based on the alternation of power (taking ‘turns’) between the
two main liberal dynastic parties, namely the conservative party and the liberal progressive party. When
one party’s term ended, the other would succeed it at the helm of government, thereby guaranteeing the
stability of the constitutional monarchy (based on the constitution of 1876) and marginalizing more
extreme political parties.
3The encasillado was a form of fixing political elections, and the term specifically referred to the list of
electoral candidates drawn up by the government. Based on an agreement in place among the main
liberal parties, the executive branch would use its power to assign districts to these candidates, where
they would be elected.
4See, for example, M. Cabrera, ‘La reforma del reglamento de la Ca´mara de diputados en 1918’,
Revista de Estudios Polı´ticos 93, (1996), pp. 345–57.
5See E. Garcı´a, ¿Espan˜a neutral? La Marina Mercante espan˜ola durante la Primera Guerra Mundial
(Madrid, 2005); F.J. Ponce Marrero, Canarias en la Gran Guerra, 1914–18: estrategia y diplomacia. Un
estudio sobre la politica exterior de Espan˜a (Gran Canaria, 2006); C. Garcı´a Sanz, La Primera Guerra
Mundial en el estrecho de Gibraltar: economı´a, polı´tica y relaciones internacionales (Madrid, 2011); F. Garcı´a
Sanz, Espan˜a en la Gran Guerra. Espı´as, diploma´ticos y traficantes (Barcelona, 2014).
6For the role played by the neutral countries, above all concerning the economic policy of the belli-
gerent powers, see M. Frey, ‘The Neutrals and World War One’, Defence Studies 3, (2000), pp. 1–39.
Additional ideas worthy of analysis were brought to light during the international seminar entitled ‘Neu-
trality and Neutralities in the Great War. Latest Approaches to Economic Warfare’, which was held at
the Escuela Espan˜ola de Historia y Arqueologia in Rome on 18 November 2013.
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to the lesser known examples of Holland7 and Greece.8 As far as Spain is con-
cerned, much remains to be said about how the politics of the period dealt with vio-
lations of the country’s sovereignty on the part of the belligerent nations. On the
other hand, more attention has been paid to the foreign policy strategies put in
place,9 the direct effects of the war on domestic politics10 and the systems of gov-
ernance that were introduced in order to deal with the war’s effects on civil
society.11 Indeed, Spain was witness on more than one occasion to what historians
have defined as ‘forms of wartime government’.12 There AQ1
¶
were numerous public
speeches on the dynamics of a free-market economy13 and in support of those citi-
zens affected by the economic crisis or directly involved in the conflict (such as the
sailors and seafarers who succumbed to underwater warfare);14 significant limit-
ations were placed on constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and civil rights;15
naturalization processes were suspended;16 and certain ministers saw their admin-
istrative authority and powers reformed, in order that other ministers could benefit.
All of these aspects left their mark on the parliamentary debate, as evidenced by a
proposal previously put forward by a Spanish deputy in 1916 to institute a ‘special
ministry’, the elements of which were entirely analogous to the ‘wartime minis-
tries’ put in place by the belligerent countries. Its task was described in military
7S. Kruizinga, ‘NOT Neutrality. The Dutch Government, the Netherlands Oversea Trust Company,
and the Entente Blockade of Germany, 1914–1918’, in J. den Hertog and S. Kruizinga (eds), Caught in the
Middle: Neutrals, Neutrality, and the First World War (Amsterdam, 2011), pp. 85–104.
8 The case of Greece is just as interesting, and more can be found in T. Fregadi Areti, ‘Violations de la
neutralite´ grecque par les Puissances de l’Entente durant la Premie`re guerre mondiale’, Balkan Studies 1,
(1985), pp. 113–29 and R. Porte, ‘Comment faire plier un neutre? L’action politique et militaire de la
France en Gre`ce (1915–1917)’, Cahiers de la Mediterrane´e 81, (2010), pp. 45–62.
9See F. Garcı´a Sanz, ‘Espan˜a y la Primera Guerra Mundial: sı´ntesis de la polı´tica exterior durante la
restauracio´n’, in Espan˜a entre republicas, 1868–1939: Actas VII Jornadas de Castilla – La Mancha sobre Inves-
tigacio´n en Archivos, vol. 2 (Guadalajara, 2007), pp. 703–24; R. Pardo Sanz, ‘Espan˜a ante el conflicto be´lico
de 1914–1918: ¿Una esplendida neutralidad?’, in S. Forner (ed.), Coyuntura internacional y polı´tica espa-
n˜ola (1898–2004) (Madrid, 2010), pp. 45–64.
10M. Martorell Linares, ‘“No fue aquello solamente una guerra. Fue una revolucio´n”: Espan˜a y la
Primera Guerra Mundial’, Historia y Polı´tica 26, (2011), pp. 17–45.
11An example of this can be seen in the humanitarian aid efforts spearheaded and financed by the
Crown, and subject of J. Pando, Un rey para la esperanza: la Espan˜a humanitaria de Alfonso XIII en la
Gran Guerra (Madrid, 2010).
12This definition was used and defined for the first time in P. Renouvin, Les Formes du gouvernement de
guerre, 1925.
13To cite a few examples, the following bills were debated in 1916: a bill to offer aid to businesses, a
project for an agricultural bank and a project for a foreign commerce bank.
14By the middle of 1917 more than one hundred sailors and seafarers had already died, and over 20 per
cent of Spanish merchant shipping had been lost, Garcı´a Sanz, Espan˜a en la Gran Guerra, pp. 328–9.
15Please refer to M. Aglietti, ‘Para garantizar el respeto a la neutralidad espan˜ola. ¿Una ley liberticida y
antiparlamentaria o la bu´squeda de una perspectiva europea?’, presented at the international conference
‘Undefended Neutrality: The Culture of Peace in Europe during the Great War’ (Seville, 26–27 Novem-
ber 2014), and which will be published in the conference proceedings.
16There were many cases in which Spanish naturalization was denied because of the war, including to
persons who were born in Spain to Spanish mothers. See AGA, (10)003.007.54/2431, Ministerio de Estado,
Nacionalidades, Asuntos contenciosos (1919), ins. 10.
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terms: to prepare ‘weapons and munitions for a commercial war’ and ‘a plan to
rebuild the country AQ2
¶
’.17
Fabienne Bock’s study of the French Parliament during the Great War18 is an
excellent example of how the analysis of a country’s legislative body can offer a
better understanding of the extent to which war acted as a driving force for insti-
tutional and administrative change. Apart from the inevitable differences
between the two cases, Spain also witnessed the modernization of some of its
administrative framework, while other organs of government missed the opportu-
nity for change and at the end of the war they were reinstated to their original
form. There is no doubt, however, that the war in Europe offered an important
chance for parliamentary members to reflect on – and at times clash over – the
nature of their work, especially in terms of how it related to the executive
branch. This article will not focus on the well-known aspects of the crisis around
the liberal monarchy that was taking place in that period,19 in order that it can
delve into the nature of the interaction between Parliament and the government
on warfare issues.
The Cortes held 374 sessions between July 1914 and June 1919. While these
figures were not extraordinarily high, this level of activity was certainly not
limited to Spain, as other countries registered even lower numbers during the
same period. For example, the Italian Chamber of Deputies – which on average
held more than 100 sessions per year – held only 190 sessions between 1915 and
1918. In 1915 there were only 43 sessions registered, and even fewer in 1918,
when a mere 38 were held.20 Furthermore, the number of sessions held did not
itself tell the whole story: in or out of session, the Cortes staked its claim to fulfilling
a role that was necessary for the functioning of the state apparatus. Indeed, the gov-
ernment could not do without the Cortes lest it undermined its own legitimacy, and
any laws introduced by decree were subject to a form of a posteriori sanction on the
part of Parliament when they were subsequently ratified. This delay was justified
by the state of emergency that was in place at the time. Furthermore, deputies and
senators were offered an additional opportunity to participate in the political hand-
ling of the crisis and to keep it in check by being present on the numerous special
commissions and committees that were established to deal with specific situations.
It would be just as mistaken to claim that the legislative branch had been
stripped of its power by pointing to the fact that the topic of war scarcely appeared
as an item on the parliamentary agenda. As was the case in other countries, Spain’s
elected officials were effectively silenced because the ongoing conflict demanded
17Taken from the speech by the pro-Catalan deputy Francesc Cambo´, in DSC, 31 October 1916, n. 79,
pp. 2335.
18F. Bock, Un parlamentarisme de guerre 1914–19 (Paris, 2002).
19There is not enough space here to offer an extensive treatment of the historiography on this topic, so
I refer readers to the still indispensable works of: M. Cabrera et al. (eds), Con luz y taquı´grafos. El Parla-
mento en la Restauracio´n (1913–1923) (Madrid, 1998); and more recently, M.A. Martorell Linares, ‘La
crisis parlamentaria de 1913–1917. La quiebra del sistema de relaciones parlamentarias de la Restaura-
cion’, Revista de Estudios Politicos 96, (1997), pp. 137–61. Please refer to the updated bibliography of this
last work.
20I would like to thank Professor Michela Minesso for providing me with this data.
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as much. Indeed, this was the new form of parliamentary patriotism that appeared
across all of Europe: the government required unanimous support, strategic infor-
mation was to be kept confidential and a certain degree of self-censorship was to be
applied. And, no differently than the rest of Europe, Spanish deputies and senators
opposed this level of discretion, which at times seemed excessive and even detri-
mental to freedom of expression and the rights thereto related; in the process, they
were able to find new ways to interact with civil society. Without doubt, the most
sensational instance of opposition was the convening of a second Parliament in July
1917, a year in which the Cortes sat for a mere two months. Entitled the Asemblea de
Parlamentarios disidentes, almost 70 parliamentary members convened in Barcelona.
Most of the participants were exponents of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista, but there
were also socialists and republicans, as well as a dozen monarchists. They were all
united in their goal to introduce sweeping political reform and to put an end to the
turno system of government.21 No less important was the supporting role played by
the press gallery.22 The press was a fundamental tool not only during Cortes recess
periods, but also when the publication of Diario de sesiones de las Cortes was subject
to censorship.23 As a demonstration of their commitment to the Spanish people,
elected representatives saw to the publication of excerpts and full transcripts of
parliamentary debates in the press; ever since the Cadiz constitution of 1812,
this had been an integral part of an elected official’s duty in service to their
country. By publishing more and more political articles and editorials – often
penned under pseudonyms – in local papers and in papers with a party affiliation,
Spanish representatives attempted to keep their finger on the pulse of the nation.
The press thus came to embody the patriotic voice of Parliament. The government,
however, resorted to a rhetoric of national defence in reacting to this behaviour, as
it believed it had a patriotic duty to protect the Spanish people. Whenever a par-
liamentary member exposed the fragility of a country that was at the mercy of
the belligerent powers, he would be accused of treason, sedition or defamation
against the homeland, the king or one of his ministers, and proceedings of the
supreme court would be initiated. The number of cases on record of such litigation
is witness to the widespread use of this political tool at the time, although it did not
seem to amount to much more than a deterrent. The Cortes would routinely vote
down authorization to prosecute one of its own members, thereby forcing the
supreme court to settle the charges with a ruling of ‘sobreseimiento libre’ (which
was essentially an acquittal due to a stay of proceedings). This sentence was the
equivalent of an acquittal, and there were also many cases in which pardons
were granted.
21See F.J. Romero Salvado´, Espan˜a 1914–1918. Entre la guerra y la revolucio´n (Barcelona, 2002),
pp. 119–40.
22At least 40 parliamentary members could be directly linked to journalism in 1916, many of whom
were editors-in-chief of some of the most prominent newspapers in Madrid and in Spain, as was the
case with El Liberal, El Imparcial, El Heraldo de Madrid, ABC, La Correspondencia de Espan˜a, El
Radical, El Socialista, Diario universal and others. See P. Gomez, Aparicio, Historia del Periodismo
espan˜ol (Madrid, 1974), v. 3, p. 447.
23The censorship of the publication – in whole or in part – of debates that were printed in the Diario
de sesiones de las Cortes was not called off until June 1919. See GM, 24 June 1919.
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To sum up, Spain’s various institutions found numerous ways to appeal to patri-
otism, and in doing so they managed to incorporate – and at times clash with – the
traditional, ingrained elements of the Restoration’s political dialectic.24
While this article does not aim to offer a comprehensive analysis of the issue, it
will examine some of the salient moments in the parliamentary debate over the
Great War and, in particular, those exchanges which best shed light on the relation-
ship between the government and the Cortes. As can be expected, these debates
coincided with the outbreak of the war and with its conclusion (specifically, with
the armistice of 11 November 1918, and later, with the signing of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles on 28 June 1919). It should be stated at the outset that, from the decision to
remain neutral up to the official congratulatory messages sent out at the end of the
conflict, the Spanish executive branch acted entirely on its own and presented any
decisions to the Parliament as a fait accompli.
FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY TO THE PEACE TREATIES:
THE WAR IN PARLIAMENT
When the war broke out, Eduardo Dato – who was the prime minister at the time
and a member of the conservative party – proclaimed the neutrality of Spain
without involving Parliament, which was not in session owing to its regular
summer recess. The first announcement was published on 30 July 1914 in
Madrid’s Gaceta Oficial, on behalf of the Ministerio de Estado.25 It was a short text
which had been drawn up in response to information received from the Spanish
ambassador in Vienna on the existing state of war between Austria–Hungary and
Serbia. In it, ‘Spanish subjects’ were ‘ordered’ to adhere to ‘the utmost neutrality,
in accordance with the laws in force and with the principles of public international
law’. Anyone who violated this order would lose the protection due to him or her as
a subject of the Spanish kingdom; anyone who carried out or promoted military
recruitment on national territory would be subject to the penalties set forth in
the penal code (art. 150).
Considering the country’s weakened condition from an economic – and above
all, military – point of view, there was no other choice but to remain neutral.26 It
was hoped that Spain could establish some sort of role on the international scene
as a champion of diplomacy in resolving the conflict, but any such aspirations
were quickly dashed. Overall, the decision was met with some degree of consensus
on the part of the representatives of the main political groups, despite the fact that
they did not have an opportunity to debate the issue in Parliament; in any case, they
did not hesitate to voice their opinions through the press. The same was true for
Spanish society in general, as evidenced by the numerous expressions of approval
that were sent directly to the government by local associations and institutions.27
24See M. Aglietti, ‘Pan y toros. Parole e stereotipi della retorica elettorale liberale nella Spagna di fine
Ottocento’, in P. Finelli, V. Galimi and G.L. Fruci (eds), Parole in azione. Strategie comunicative e ricezione
del discorso politico in Europa fra Otto e Novecento (Milan and Florence, 2012), pp. 127–45.
25GM, 30 July 1914, n. 211, p. 238.
26G. Maura and M. Ferna´ndez Almagro, Por que´ cayo´ Alfonso XIII (Madrid, 1948), pp. 472–3.
27See AGA, (9) 02.08_51/00051, Presidencia del Gobierno, Subsecretaria, Asuntos generales, various files.
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At the opening of the Cortes on 30 October, 1914, the Diario de sesiones did not
record any mention of the proclamation of neutrality that had taken place. This was
despite the fact that several proclamations of a similar nature had been made, one
after another, between July and September, upon the entry into war of each new
combatant. Indeed, Dato did not present Parliament with the government’s
reasons for choosing neutrality until 5 November, when requested to do so by
deputies hailing from the socialist republican minority. On that occasion, he
limited himself to reaffirming that neutrality was the only remaining option for
Spain, and that ‘in terms of national defence’, all the necessary measures would
be taken ‘without saying another word to the Parliament, in the firm belief that
the chamber and the country stand . . . side by side with the government’. If
this position of neutrality were to go against the national interest at any point,
‘we will turn to the Parliament before making even the slightest change to our
status. . . . And if the Cortes should be in recess, we will convene them so that
they can decide on this fundamental issue for the life of Spain, because we, Sirs,
have total faith and unwavering trust in the power of patriotism and in the
wisdom of the Cortes.’28 As those present applauded, Dato concluded his speech
with an appeal to patriotic unity, that ‘true form of national solidarity that brings
everyone together, from the king down to every last citizen’. The radical Alejandro
Lerroux and the socialist Pablo Iglesias were quick to voice their objections to
Dato’s message, and although they ended up being marginalized, their reasoning
was certainly suggestive of dissent among the parliamentary members. Lerroux
pointed out the inconsistency in claiming – as the prime minister had done –
that ‘the country would be consulted through its elected Parliament’ in order to
abandon its neutral stance, ‘[while] this had not been done in proclaiming neu-
trality’.29 Iglesias protested that it was ‘the government’s duty’ to respect ‘the Par-
liament’s right’ to decide on a topic of such great importance, instead of ‘locking it
out’ of the debate.30
The deputies from the Catalan Lliga Regionalista took up the issue on the fol-
lowing day. Juan Ventosa Calvell opened the session by accusing the executive
branch of not having followed the example set by other European countries –
whether belligerent or neutral – in dealing with the economic repercussions of
the war. Indeed, other countries had wasted no time in setting up public insti-
tutions which would see to implementing any of the countless measures that the
situation would require. In contrast, Spain was two months late in setting up a
Junta de iniciativas (a commission in in charge of formulating a series of economic
proposals aimed at limiting the effects of the war on the domestic market). Further-
more, no concrete proposals had yet been made to Parliament.31 It had been the
‘vital forces of Spain’ that made up for these shortcomings on the part of the
28DSC, 5 November 1914, n. 77, p. 2137.
29DSC, 5 November 1914, n. 77, p. 2138.
30DSC, 5 November 1914, n. 77, p. 2138.
31This Junta was set up by decree on 18 September 1914 and it should have lasted until the end of the
war. It was dissolved on 2 February 1915, however, after having presented the government with almost
90 (87 to be precise) different initiatives based on the analysis and selection of 170 proposals that had
been sent in from all over Spain on the part of companies, associations, industries etc.
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government, as the country’s associations and corporations had sent in potential
initiatives to be undertaken by Parliament. All the proposals were worthy of atten-
tion, because, in Calvell’s words, ‘I do not believe that patriotism means holding
one’s peace, nor does it mean speaking in euphemisms; I believe, rather, that it
is . . . everyone’s duty to speak up and express his own opinion.’32
On 23 November 1914, the government formally adopted the provisions of
Hague Convention XIII of 18 October 1907, concerning the rights and duties of
neutral powers in naval war.33 Although this may have been due to pressure
exerted by parliamentary members, it was more likely the result of the first
serious consequences brought on by the war. Just a few weeks afterwards, the
deputy Francesc Cambo´ questioned the relationship between Parliament and
the government in terms of facing the economic problems that would inevitably
sweep across the nation as the conflict unfolded.34 A significant part of the sessions
between 12 and 15 December would be dedicated to this debate, and other min-
isters besides Dato would have their say, including the finance minister, Bugallal.
Cambo´ complained about the fact that the issue had not yet been the subject of
extensive debate, and that on the contrary, it should be ‘the main, if not only,
topic of our resolutions’. He was critical of those who boasted – as the prime min-
ister had done – that the Spanish Parliament had held more sessions than any other
European country since the war broke out, when in reality the legislative body’s
resolutions proved to be of ‘such indifference, such futility, such obliviousness’
as to bring shame on parliamentary members and the executive branch. The gov-
ernments of other nations – including the neutral countries, whom Spain was
keeping a close eye on – had involved the legislative branch, even if only to
grant the government with the extraordinary powers needed to urgently adopt
special measures. The Spanish government, however, did no such thing, and it
had instead opted for a stance of total political and economic ineptitude. Cambo´
was appalled at the fact that almost three months had passed since sessions had
started up again, yet nothing had changed in the Parliament’s agenda: there
were still items addressing the approval of a budget that had been drawn up
before war broke out and that had not been touched since. Only two unofficial
notes had hinted that the council of ministers was working on projects regarding
the economy and national defence, but none of these plans had been the subject
of parliamentary debate. The Catalan deputy felt that this global emergency
should be used as a catalyst for the creation of a true national government, one
that would represent the collective consciousness of the entire country under the
banner of a ‘holy patriotic union’. In contrast, the government had been lingering
in a state of ‘prejudice, separation and divorce’ when dealing with Parliament,
choosing to keep it in the dark about everything. Not only did this contribute to
32DSC, 5 November 1914, n. 78, pp. 2184–5.
33GM, 24 November 1914, n. 328, pp. 523–7.
34Relaciones entre el Parlamento y el Gobierno frente a` los problemas economicos que plantea en Espan˜a la
actual conflagracion europea, in DSC, 12 December 1914, n. 107, pp. 3263–75; DSC, 14 December
1914, n. 108, pp. 3298–306; DSC, 15 December 1914, pp. 3334–5.
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debasing the role of the country’s legislative arm, it also weakened the authority of
the government itself.
Thus, an all-out war was being waged within the institutions as well, evidenced
in part by the bombastic rhetoric that was being employed. The ‘worldwide out-
break of hostilities’ forced the Spanish government to ‘arm’ itself with the
means needed to face the consequences ‘valiantly’ and ‘victoriously’, and Parlia-
ment would have to grant ‘sweeping authorization’ in the name of national solidar-
ity. Failure to do so would take the hope of a ‘national rebuilding’ and turn it into
‘national disintegration’ brought on by the clash between political parties and
between conflicting local interests.35 The institutional concerns raised by Cambo´
would go unanswered; Dato shifted the chamber’s attention to the issue of
setting up free ports in Cadiz and Barcelona, and the topic would not be brought
up again.
The Great War was brought to the attention of the Upper House for the first
time on 1 February 1915, by the liberal senator Juan Navarro Reverter. He sub-
mitted a formal question to the prime minister in which he expressed his hope
for ‘an extensive debate on the situation that had arisen in the country because
of this international conflict that has afflicted all of us’.36 Navarro endorsed the gov-
ernment’s decision to remain neutral, and he even approved of the fact that the
government had proclaimed as much without consulting with the Cortes or with
the main political figures in the country. Nevertheless, he did not want to be con-
strued as giving up his ‘terrible habit of thinking’, nor was he surrendering Parlia-
ment’s right to consider the measures needed to address the damage caused by the
war. One only had to look at the other neutral countries, where Parliaments had
changed their own legislation and had authorized stronger state interventionism
in economic affairs. That was not the case in Spain, where weak – if not contradic-
tory – measures had been implemented in matters concerning imports and exports,
bank lending and public works.37
Prime Minister Dato once again stated the reasons for going the way of neu-
trality and for doing so without resorting to consultation beforehand. In his view,
consulting with the legislative body would have only been good for ‘scaremonger-
ing, if not spreading downright panic, and that is what, more than anything else,
would have led to the nation’s immediate economic ruin’. He continued by
saying that politics has a short memory, and one is quick to forget ‘the seriousness
of past events’, not to mention ‘the difficulties the nation must struggle with in
order to maintain a state of normalcy’.38
It is this last observation that offers the key to interpreting the patriotic dis-
course that the Spanish government called for in those frantic months. Instead of
launching an effort to strengthen the nation’s institutions, the government held
on to this overriding image of a country that had to be kept under special
35DSC, 12 December 1914, n. 107, pp. 3263–8.
36DSS, 1 February 1915, n. 132, pp. 2093–4.
37DSS, 2 February 1915, n. 133, pp. 2102–13.
38DSS, 3 February 1915, n. 134, pp. 2120–8, taken from the speech delivered by Prime Minister Dato.
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control, because riots, revolts and chaos represented an endemic risk.39 It was for
this reason that any attempt to build a relationship of trust on equal terms with
the legislative branch was destined to founder. Dato’s speeches to the congress
of deputies in November 1914 and to the senate in February 1915 would lay the
groundwork for defining Spain’s balance of power during the war. They even
became the official documents on the subject of ‘the Spanish government’s procla-
mation of neutrality in response to the ongoing war’ and ‘the situation that has
arisen in Spain due to the European war’, which were sent to all of the kingdom’s
representatives abroad for their information and as instructions for them to follow.40
By appealing to the legislative branch’s sense of patriotism, the executive
branch sought to justify its exclusion of Parliament from the decision-making
process. Such a justification was necessary lest they reawaken that destructive
power which in the past had brought Spain to its knees under the yoke of political
and social disorder. The fact that the Spanish government resorted to this kind of
rhetoric showed a marked departure from the institutional dynamics playing out in
other European parliaments at the time. As Cambo´ and Navarro pointed out, the
fears raised by the Great War were not being used to reaffirm Parliament’s active
and conscious support of government action; on the contrary, they were being
used to marginalize Parliament’s contributions, thereby speeding up the de-legit-
imization of the entire system. Furthermore, this type of rhetoric was beginning to
show all the signs of wearing thin with age and becoming that much more ineffec-
tive. This was no longer the Cortes of 1876, when tangible fears could be used as
leverage; in terms of both age and political experience, the parliamentary
members during the Great War were far removed from the dramatic events of
the Sexenio41 and the military pronunciamientos (a form of military coup d’e´tat) of
the previous century.42 Social peace in Spain was facing distinctly different
threats in the early 1900s, and as such required new solutions.
The government’s stance on the Cortes ended up bringing together both conser-
vative and liberal prime ministers. In October 1916, Marcelino Domingo Sanjuan,
deputy of the republican minority, directed a question to the prime minister at the
time, the liberal Count of Romanones. He asked to discuss Spain’s decision on neu-
trality, and to do so ‘for the sake of Parliament’s respectability, for the sake of
national dignity’ and in order to prevent ‘these so-called patriotic silences’ from
39The use of this kind of rhetoric was quite well known. See M. Aglietti, Cortes, nazione e cittadinanza.
Immaginario e rappresentazione delle istituzioni politiche nella Spagna della Restauracion (1874–1900),
(Bologna, 2011), pp. 123–36.
40AHN, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, H3147, unnumbered insert, Correspondencia ministerios,
Senado y Congreso, Circulares y otros documentos – 1914 – Guerra Europea, circular letters containing
royal orders from 7 November 1914 and from 3 February 1915.
41This term refers to a six-year period of democratic revolution, starting with the revolution of 1868
and ending with the coup d’e´tat of 1874, which restored the Bourbon monarchy under Alfonso XII. It
was a turbulent period that coincided with the First Spanish Republic, which was based on the progress-
ive, democratic constitution of 1869.
42A comprehensive analysis of the social-professional profiles of the deputies who served in this period
can be found in F. Del Rey Reguillo and J. Moreno Luzo´n, ‘Semblanza de la e´lite parlamentaria en la
crisis de la Restauracio´n (1914–1923)’, Revista de Estudios Polı´ticos 93, (1996), pp. 177–201.
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turning into ‘patriotic error, humiliation and shame’.43 Romanones responded that
his predecessor, Dato, had deemed such a debate unnecessary, since the Cortes had
been of the opinion that ‘the most patriotic thing was to . . . keep silent and place
their complete and total trust’ in the government. He went on to say that unless
that was no longer the Cortes’ stance on the issue, then there was no reason to
change approaches. In any case, if Domingo was prepared to take responsibility
for the ‘many risks’ that came with discussing the issue, then the government
would be willing to do so. The matter ended there but, in reflecting on the
episode years later, Romanones would reveal just how inherently dangerous the
issue had been: because of ‘the way things stood’ at the time, had they opened a
debate on Spain’s neutrality and possibly considered aligning themselves with
the allied powers, ‘it would have become impossible for the Cortes to function prop-
erly, and it would have undoubtedly led to the fall of the government’.44
The months went by and the war raged on, taking an ever-heavier toll on the
countries involved. 1917 was the annus horribilis for the Spanish Cortes, as it
would set a record for the lowest number of sessions held. There had been 122 ses-
sions in 1916, and there would be 109 in 1918, but in 1917 a mere 22 sessions were
held in the months of January and February: for the next 12 months, all sessions
were suspended. Nevertheless, it was in one of those sessions in February 1917
that deputy Cambo´ once again brought up the issue of the anomalous Spanish situ-
ation ‘with regard to foreign problems’. He was able to acutely capture the impasse
that the legislative body had found itself grappling with in the name of that mista-
ken sense of patriotism:
There is not a single man among us who does not want the government to have the
utmost power and authority, no matter who is heading it, as the government represents
Spain to the world . . . But honorable members, perhaps it is we who are different
from the rest of the world? Is the Spanish parliament not the equal of other parlia-
ments? Perhaps patriotism in Spain cannot be expressed in any other way except
through silence?45
The war would again be a topic of debate in November of 1918. As coincidence
would have it, news of the armistice marking Germany’s surrender broke on the
same day that a new government was to be appointed. The session was presided
over by Manuel Garcı`a Prieto, who was standing in for the outgoing Prime Minister
Maura. Even before the regular session commenced, some deputies had submitted
a pair of ‘proposiciones’ in which two statements that had been drawn up to express
joy over the end of the war were to be put to a vote before the lower house. The
texts were similar in their intent, yet different in the way in which the said joy
was to be worded. The congress of deputies and the government were thus
faced with the urgent need to discuss the issue and decide whether and how to
align themselves, albeit at the end of the war.
43DSC, 13 October 1916, n. 66, p. 1798.
44Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida (1912–1931) (Madrid, 1947), vol. III, p. 107.
45DSC, 17 February 1917, n. 18, p. 507.
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The first statement was presented by Jose´ Manuel Pedregal and it had been
signed by seven deputies (mostly exponents of the Partido Reformista, which was
cut from the mould of the liberal democrats and the republicans). It proposed
sending ‘the most heartfelt and enthusiastic congratulations’ to the Parliaments
of the allied powers, all the more so in light of the victory ‘for law, liberty and
democracy’, which was ‘so closely tied to the future of Spain’.46 The other state-
ment was presented by Manuel Gonza`lez Hontoria and signed by another seven
liberal deputies, almost all of whom identified with the liberal faction of Roma-
nones.47 This text limited itself to joining in the general jubilation surrounding
the end of the war and the fact that justice once again reigned over force. The gov-
ernment – which at the time included Romanones as minister of state – subscribed
to the latter proposition, because, as Garcı`a Prieto claimed, it was more represen-
tative of the country’s general mood. A debate flared up on the floor of the lower
house and Pedregal defended the document he had presented, claiming that it
was in Spain’s best interests to subscribe to it. It would show that Spain possessed
the same values as the victorious powers, including those values of a political and
institutional nature. It was time to for them to recognize their own kind; in other
words, to recognize ‘the Parliaments of the allied powers, so that we ourselves
can be considered a deliberative Parliament’. In this way, Spain could reclaim its
place among the group of European Parliaments that stood for the ‘ideals of
liberty, law and democracy’.48
In short, there were two conflicting visions of the legislative branch’s role: one
was intent on strengthening the Parliament’s role by drawing inspiration from the
new democracies in Europe; the other continued to tread the path of tradition,
which granted the executive branch any and all decision-making power and justi-
fied it by appealing to the need for unanimity to protect against the risk of partisan
divisions. In the end, the course of action proposed by Gonza`lez Hontoria would
prevail, as he reasserted his view that Parliament would do best to distance itself
from taking a stance in favour of one side or another, even if the war was over:
We disagree [with the proposal of Sr Pedregal] for two reasons: first of all, because we
believe that it is incumbent upon the government alone to take any initiative and bear
all responsibility as far as foreign policy is concerned . . . . Secondly, because we are
not here to divide; indeed we have proposed doing just the opposite, inviting everyone
to set aside their criticism, first and foremost that criticism which we too once sup-
ported in the past. But what do you think? That we do not have a clear position on
the international politics of Spain? . . . .
In defending this stance, I have deliberately ignored all that has been thought and said
during the war; I wanted to have you forget whether the facts confirmed or
46DSC, 12 November 1918, n. 92, p. 2979. This text was signed by Jose´ Manuel Pedregal, Juan Un˜a
Sartou, Leopoldo Romeo, Ramo`n Alvarez Valde´s, Jose´ Lları` Areny, Vicente Alvarez Villamil and Pablo
de Azca`rate.
47DSC, 12 November 1918, n. 92, p. 2979. The document was signed by Manuel Gonzalez Hontoria,
Jose´ Morote, Leopoldo Romeo, Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, Joaquin Salvatella, Mateo Azpeitia and Jose´
Abril y Ochoa.
48DSC, 12 November 1918, n. 92, p. 2979.
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contradicted the predictions each of you had made; in fact, what I really wanted was
for us to unanimously look toward the future.49
The senate also witnessed a similar clash between the two ways of viewing Parlia-
ment’s task as an institution, and the outcome was no different. It was clear to
everyone that the world had changed, and that the end of the war had ushered
in a new era for modern nations which would see a ‘total overhaul of all values,
not just on an economic level, but on a social and political level as well’. Nonethe-
less, if Parliament wanted to find itself on an equal footing with the other powers,
then its task would not be so much to set the country on the path to reform – which,
on the contrary, would have divided the nation – but more to buttress the respect-
ability and authority of the government, and to offer up its unanimous support as a
guard against political partisanship (or partidismos).50 As was the case in the lower
house, the senate held a brief debate on the motion which would formalize Spain’s
joy over the end of the war. In particular, there was a dispute over the opportune-
ness of including a phrase that had been proposed by the senator Amalio Gimeno y
Caban˜as, in which reference was made to the ‘triumph of justice and law over war’.
This wording was deemed by some to be too one-sided: in the end, it would be the
opinion of Joaquı`n Sanchez de Toca that prevailed, as he stated that ‘in inter-
national matters, the only voice of the people should be that of their own govern-
ment’. And with that declaration, he left any further issues in the hands of Garcı`a
Prieto, to the unanimous support of the upper house.51
Nothing was left unscripted, however, when the signing of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles was announced to the Cortes: this time, the government was one step ahead
of Parliament. Over the course of the weekend between the signing of the treaty
and the first possible day to announce the event (the following Monday, 1 July
1919), the government arranged for the speeches to be given with the presidents
of the two houses. In this way, deputies and senators simultaneously received
news of both the treaty and the words of congratulations that Madrid had already
sent out to the allied governments. The President of the Senate, Manuel Allende-
salazar, called on those present to subscribe to the government’s initiative without
drawing up a text of their own, and to entrust the government with the task of com-
municating its congratulations to the upper houses of the allied powers. The pro-
posal was put to a vote without debate, as it was a topic on which ‘nothing more
was to be said, because this is a moment that calls more for listening than for
singing songs of celebration, be they poetic or not’.52 Acting in his then role as min-
ister of state, Gonza`lez Hontoria once again asserted that it would be opportune for
the senate to limit itself to ‘backing the president’s proposal as a sign of Spain’s
firmness in its international stance, and to show that no matter what our internal
divisions may be, when dealing with foreign affairs we will always be able to
49DSC, 12 November 1918, n. 92, p. 2980.
50This is taken from the speech by Senator Sanchez de Toca, DSS, 12 November 1918, n. 90,
pp. 1555–6.
51DSS, 13 November 1918, n. 91, pp. 1563–6.
52DSS, 1 July 1919, n. 6, p. 55.
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unite all of our efforts into one, on behalf and for the love of Spain’.53 The senate
warmly approved the proposal.
At the same time, the government’s announcement was delivered by Marquis
de Figueroa, president of the lower house. In doing so, he called for a unanimous
expression of jubilation to be sent to the Parliaments of the allied powers. On this
occasion, he made no mention of delegating this task to the government, but the
prime minister would see to that personally when he spoke to the deputies
immediately afterwards. In anticipation of potential objections that might be
raised, Antonio Maura opened his speech by describing how the government had
already expressed ‘its sentiment, which it believes is in line with that of the
nation’, and that it had done so without consulting with the houses because they
had been closed for their weekly recess. He then stated that the government
would gladly take it upon itself to pass on the lower house’s message as proposed
by de Figueroa, which amounted to presenting it to the house as a fait accompli.
Thus, the house approved the motion without debate; only the socialist minority
abstained, not because they disagreed with the how the motion was carried but
because of other specific issues.54
Once again, the government had exploited patriotism as a way of limiting the
Parliament’s right to take initiatives and exert some degree of control over the
country’s affairs. Not only that, it had also used patriotism to assign itself the
task of embodying the spirit of the nation; a responsibility that would have been
fair to expect from the country’s representative body. While the government
may have respected convention, as evidenced by its seeking out the support of
the presidents of the two houses, the procedure put in place by Maura relegated
the legislative branch to a secondary role and doomed parliamentary members to
silence. This is because any opposition voices would have been reduced to a
futile exercise of rhetoric, which would be seen as contradictory to the strong
and unified image that Spain wanted to project to the world.
HOW A NEUTRAL COUNTRY WAS DEFEATED BY THE GREAT WAR
An inherent consequence of dealing with an emergency situation was the consoli-
dation of executive powers. It went hand in hand with the expectation that the leg-
islative branch would offer its unconditional support – a solid foundation built on a
spirit of patriotism, though not without some moralizing as well – and that this was
to galvanize the country’s institutions in the face of the dangers of war. But in
Spain, however, things became complicated.
The government in Madrid opted not to formally declare a state of emergency.
On the contrary, despite the need to implement all kinds of measures in order to
address the most pernicious of the war’s effects, a regime of ‘normalcy’ was offi-
cially maintained. Above all, this included the government’s stance on the Cortes,
because it feared that any admission of crisis would lead to even worse turmoil
and to a definitive loss of control over the country. It was no coincidence that
53DSS, 1 July 1919, n. 6, p. 55.
54See the speech by Indalecio Prieto, DSC, 1 July 1919, n. 4, pp. 74–5.
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the first ‘special law’ – the Ley dotando al Poder pu´blico de facultades indispensables
para garantizar la neutralidad de Espan˜a – was not submitted for parliamentary
approval until July 1918.55 Germany, Britain, France and others had been interven-
ing in and influencing Spain’s delicate economic, political and social balance in
ways that were not always so evident. A saturation point had been reached and
the time had come to adopt appropriate countermeasures, even if it meant admit-
ting to the Parliament and to the nation that the situation had become difficult to
keep under control. It was obviously a late response to the problem. At that point,
the executive branch’s authority had been significantly undermined because of the
position it had taken on the legislative arm of government. The latter had been
excluded from participating in the management of national and international poli-
tics, and, as such, it was impossible to achieve that institutional symbiosis that Pre-
sident Poincare´ of France had happily christened ‘union sacre´e’.56 And all of this
was taking place immediately after the Cortes had opened up a serious debate on
how to evolve in order to take on a more effective role of political representation,
demonstrating a level of dynamism that it had perhaps never shown before.57
The process was anything but straightforward and it can certainly not be
reduced to simplistic arguments and counter-arguments. Even after the turning
point of 1917,58 and the arrival of the ‘gobierno nacional’59 headed by Maura in
March 1918, there were several occasions where the premiership actually high-
lighted the value of establishing parliamentary trust and being recognized as a gov-
ernment that was ‘ordained by the authority and respectability of Parliament’; the
purpose of such a government was ‘only to fulfill the Parliament’s wishes and abide
by its mandate’.60 Many of the measures put into place were formally justified as
attempts to strengthen the functioning of the legislative body. A famous
example in that regard is Maura’s ‘cry of love to Parliament’, which he delivered
to the lower house during a session held to reform the rules of procedure for the
congress of deputies. Maura’s aim was a new set of rules that would protect the leg-
islative branch from falling victim to the abuse of obstructionist tactics and govern-
ment decrees. The introduction of a so-called ‘guillotine’ mechanism (which would
allow for an issue to be put to a vote without the possibility of proposing amend-
ments or holding a debate, should the government or seven deputies request as
much) was interpreted by some as an attack on Parliament’s power to take the
initiative, but Maura contested those accusations. Maura sought to justify the use-
fulness of such a mechanism by pointing to the ineptitude of a party system.61
55GM, 4 July 1918, n. 185, pp. 21–2.
56For further details, see J.F.V. Keiger, Raymond Poincare´ (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 188–207.
57M. Martorell and F. del Rey, ‘El parlamentarismo liberal y sus impugnadores’, Ayer 63, (2006),
pp. 23–53, in particular p. 40.
58Romero Salvado´, Espan˜a 1914–1918, pp. 159–76.
59The ‘gobierno nacional’ was an extraordinary coalition between the main parties in Parliament that,
for the first time, gave rise to a new composition of government. Namely, it was no longer a government
made up of one of the two parties (the liberals or the conservatives) ‘taking turns’ in power, but rather
one that included exponents from minority parties as well.
60From the speech by Antonio Maura, in DSC , 8 April 1918, n. 12, p. 242.
61See Cabrera, ‘La reforma’, pp. 348–51.
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He was convinced that the legislative branch had to be reformed in order that it
could become an institution that was befitting and worthy of the new world that
had emerged from the ashes of the Great War.62
Though doggedly pursued, the efforts to overhaul the institutional framework
did not work out as envisaged. It should be noted that a fair share of the Spanish
ruling elite was afraid of a genuine democratic upheaval, and this played an impor-
tant role in hindering any potential reform. There was explicit reference in many
speeches to the fact that, as far as Spain was concerned, the war had not triggered
any process of institutional reform, nor had it led to achieving a ‘patriotic union’ of
political forces. There were varying opinions that sought to explain such an unwel-
come outcome, though they all returned to the usual flaws of national politics. Eloy
Bullo´n y Ferna´ndez, a liberal conservative deputy, accused the Maura government
and its anxious reformists of ‘breaking this sacred union of peace while at the same
time other countries are forming a sacred union against the war’. The result was a
worsening of the already existing rifts between parliamentary groups, instead of
moving forward ‘by uniting progress with tradition and freedom with order,
which was the country’s main protection against revolutionary movements’.63
The republican deputy Marcelino Domingo evoked the image of a ‘sacred
union’ between the government and Parliament as a consequence of the war,
while in Spain they had resorted to censorship and the suspension of constitution-
ally guaranteed rights in order to protect the partisan interests of a select few, to the
detriment of the majority. Domingo compared this to the time when conservative
groups in Parliament had defeated Minister Alba’s economic plan regarding war
profits.64 The socialist Indalecio Prieto was even more drastic in his assessment
of the sweeping political and social changes arising from the war. After pointing
out to his fellow left-leaning parliamentary members that they had chosen to
make themselves prisoners to a right-leaning government, Prieto proceeded to
say that while the aforementioned changes would drive progress in other countries,
in Spain they had the potential – ‘given the particular characteristics of the Spanish
race’ – to turn into ‘some archaic and unchecked energy, which would lead to the
country’s ruin or to its subjection to a foreign power’.65 In short, Spain was being
portrayed as a nation that had come out on the losing side of the war.
The most evocative, and in some ways the most prophetic, interpretation of
Spain’s predicament was delivered by the Count of Romanones during his inaugu-
ral address for the 1918–19 academic year at the University of Madrid. The party
system was in a state of crisis, and this had been recognized as a crucial part of
62Maura had the following to say during one of the crucial sessions for the approval of the new rules of
procedure: ‘We aim and aspire to strengthen the dignity of Parliament, to speed up its procedures, in
order that it can respond to the needs of an increasingly complex modern world that is changing
faster and faster’, in DSC, 8 April 1918, n. 12, p. 241.
63Bullon y Fernandez used these words to oppose the reform proposed for the lower house’s rules of
procedure, in DSC, 26 April 1918, n. 28, p. 667.
64DSC, 31 May 1918, n. 47, p. 1302. On the importance of this reform, which was proposed by the
liberal minister Santiago Alba but never came to fruition, see M. Martorell Linares, El santo temor al
de´ficit. Polı´tica y Hacienda en la Restauracio´n (Madrid, 2000).
65DSC, 23 April 1918, n. 25, p. 602.
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public life in all European countries. Its origins lay in the fact that political parties
had degenerated into nothing more than a tool for holding onto power. Then the
war came along, and its violent eruption forced the politics of the countries
involved to find a ‘true national goal’, while doing away with ‘all those means mas-
querading as ends’. This formed the basis for the idea of a ‘union sagrada’, in which
the fighting among political factions would be suspended and Spanish governments
would collaborate with the nation’s representatives. In Romanones’ opinion, this
was not simply the ephemeral fruit of patriotic fervour, but rather the indisputable,
concrete effect of profound change. ‘The national goal’ for the belligerent powers
had become to win the war, while the goal of the neutral countries was limited to
maintaining their status and ‘saving themselves from ruin’. Thus, on the one hand
there were the nations that acted with a view to the present and the future, in
pursuit of victory; on the other hand, there were the neutral countries, such as
Spain, who ‘were so anxious to steer clear of suffering at all costs that they only
looked at the present’, and sacrificed their future to the present in doing so. In
the wake of this short-sightedness, the old party-based system was crumbling in
a process that had been accelerated by the war, while the urge to push through
reforms had not been strong enough to resolve the age-old problems that needed
addressing. The war would eventually come to an end, and Spain would have to
come to terms with a political regime that at that point would be unsuitable for
the new historical context that had emerged, and unable to offer any government
solutions.66 Indeed, that very situation would shortly come to pass.
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